Business

School’s chain-of-command policy is not an unconstitutional prior restraint on coach-employee’s speech.

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:28:00 GMT

In a case successfully presented to the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit by Bullaro & Carton, P.C. on behalf of the LaPorte Community School Corporation and its superintendent and members of the Board of Trustees, it was held that the school’s “chain-of-command” policy was not an unconstitutional prior restraint. Samuelson v. LaPorte Community School Corp., 526 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff, a teacher within the school district, alleged that his contract for coaching the high school girls basketball team was not renewed in retaliation for his protected speech, and that the school’s chain-of-command policy was an unconstitutional prior restraint. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, which was upheld on appeal.

As coach, the plaintiff experienced several tumultuous and controversial seasons, which included a physical altercation with a player’s parent, two separate petitions requesting that the Board not renew his contract by members of the team and representatives of families in the community, and an occasion where the team refused to play under his coaching. Following these events, the superintendent provided the plaintiff with a memorandum describing his concerns regarding the plaintiff’s conduct, including his refusal to comply with the school’s chain-of-command policy by taking complaints directly to Board members without first speaking to his supervisors. The memorandum warned that the failure to comply with school policies in the future could result in discipline or termination. Subsequently, the Board voted to not renew the plaintiff’s coaching contract, based on the recommendations of the superintendent, principal, and athletic director. However, the plaintiff alleged that the his non-renewal was actually motivated by a desire to retaliate against him for his voicing of concerns regarding Title IX compliance in the past and his criticism of various school-related issues to individual Board members outside of the school’s chain-of-command policy.

The Court found that the record firmly supported the conclusion that the plaintiff’s coaching contract was not renewed because of the troubled state of the girls’ basketball program, rather than any of the plaintiff’s claimed protected expression. The 7th Circuit went on to hold that the school’s chain-of-command policy, which required staff members to refer “matters requiring administrative action” to a department supervisor before addressing them to the Board, was not an unconstitutional prior restraint. According to the Court, the policy merely addressed unprotected speech regarding the public employee’s professional duties, and did not restrict speech protected by the First Amendment.

Employer not liable for police officer/security guard's arrest of customer.

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:27:00 GMT

In a case successfully presented to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana by Bullaro & Carton, P.C. on behalf of Citizens Financial Bank, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Citizens, holding that it could not be liable for the actions of an off-duty police officer employed as a security guard in arresting a bank customer. Crenshaw v. City of East Chicago, Indiana et al., 2008 WL 2557442 (N.D.Ind.). Citizens employed an off-duty police officer to work as its security guard. After a bank customer became disorderly inside the bank, the security guard arrested the customer and placed her in handcuffs. The plaintiff’s husband was also subsequently arrested. The security guard was dressed in full police uniform including his gun holster and vest emblazoned with the word “POLICE”. The plaintiff alleged that following the arrest, while still in the bank lobby, the security guard forced her into a chair by kicking her knee thereby causing injury. Citizens moved for summary judgment arguing that the security guard was acting in his official capacity as a police officer, and not as an employee of Citizens, when he arrested the plaintiff and her husband. Granting summary judgment, the District Court held that the arrest and all efforts made thereafter to effectuate the arrest, including the alleged battery, were performed by the security guard pursuant to his public police powers. The court ruled that Citizens could not be held liable for such police actions over which they had no control.

Illinois Appellate Court Rejects “Sliding Scale” Approach For Determination Of Personal Jurisdiction Over Web Site Owner:

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:26:00 GMT

In the recent case Howard v. Missouri Bone and Joint Center, Inc., 2007 WL 1217855 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2007), the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed the dismissal of a personal injury action against an out-of-state Web site owner for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed a complaint in Illinois against a fitness center located in Missouri for personal injuries arising out of the center’s negligence in providing athletic training services to him at the center’s facility in Missouri. Because the center transacted no business in Illinois and the suit did not arise from activities in Illinois, the plaintiff argued that Illinois courts had general jurisdiction because the defendant maintained an interactive Web site that was accessible to residents of Illinois and allowed users to make appointments, fill out surveys, and ask the defendant questions. The Fifth District rejected the “sliding scale” approach used in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa. 1997), and adopted by the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, which considers a Web site’s level of interactivity in determining whether sufficient minimum contacts have been established to support jurisdiction. Finding the degree of interactivity on a Web site to be irrelevant, the court held that general jurisdiction over any out-of-state defendant, even when the defendant has an interactive Web site, is properly determined by the traditional method of considering whether the defendant had “continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum.” The court denied the need for a different standard for establishing personal jurisdiction over companies with an Internet presence, analogizing interactive Web sites to telephone or mail communications and passive Web sites to radio or magazine advertising.

Snow and ice removal in Illinois:

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:22:00 GMT

A recent Illinois Appellate Court decision held that a provision of the Snow and Ice Removal Act applies to any “sidewalk” or “walkway” that reaches or touches a residence. Bremer v. Leisure Acres-Phase II Housing Corp., 842 N.E.2d 1151 (2006). The Act states, "[a]ny owner, lessor, occupant or other person in charge of any residential property,... who removes or attempts to remove snow or ice from sidewalks abutting the property shall not be liable for any personal injuries allegedly caused by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk resulting from his or her acts or omissions unless the alleged misconduct was willful or wanton." 745 ILCS 75/2 (West 2002). The court in Bremer held that this provision applies not only to public sidewalks that border residential property, but also to any “sidewalk” or “walkway” that reaches or touches a residence.