Illinois

Illinois Appellate Court Rejects “Sliding Scale” Approach For Determination Of Personal Jurisdiction Over Web Site Owner:

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:26:00 GMT

In the recent case Howard v. Missouri Bone and Joint Center, Inc., 2007 WL 1217855 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2007), the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed the dismissal of a personal injury action against an out-of-state Web site owner for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed a complaint in Illinois against a fitness center located in Missouri for personal injuries arising out of the center’s negligence in providing athletic training services to him at the center’s facility in Missouri. Because the center transacted no business in Illinois and the suit did not arise from activities in Illinois, the plaintiff argued that Illinois courts had general jurisdiction because the defendant maintained an interactive Web site that was accessible to residents of Illinois and allowed users to make appointments, fill out surveys, and ask the defendant questions. The Fifth District rejected the “sliding scale” approach used in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa. 1997), and adopted by the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, which considers a Web site’s level of interactivity in determining whether sufficient minimum contacts have been established to support jurisdiction. Finding the degree of interactivity on a Web site to be irrelevant, the court held that general jurisdiction over any out-of-state defendant, even when the defendant has an interactive Web site, is properly determined by the traditional method of considering whether the defendant had “continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum.” The court denied the need for a different standard for establishing personal jurisdiction over companies with an Internet presence, analogizing interactive Web sites to telephone or mail communications and passive Web sites to radio or magazine advertising.

Snow and ice removal in Illinois:

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:22:00 GMT

A recent Illinois Appellate Court decision held that a provision of the Snow and Ice Removal Act applies to any “sidewalk” or “walkway” that reaches or touches a residence. Bremer v. Leisure Acres-Phase II Housing Corp., 842 N.E.2d 1151 (2006). The Act states, "[a]ny owner, lessor, occupant or other person in charge of any residential property,... who removes or attempts to remove snow or ice from sidewalks abutting the property shall not be liable for any personal injuries allegedly caused by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk resulting from his or her acts or omissions unless the alleged misconduct was willful or wanton." 745 ILCS 75/2 (West 2002). The court in Bremer held that this provision applies not only to public sidewalks that border residential property, but also to any “sidewalk” or “walkway” that reaches or touches a residence.

Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act covers injuries happening in other states:

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:21:00 GMT

The Illinois Supreme Court recently affirmed that the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over injuries occurring outside of Illinois when the contract of hire was made within Illinois. Mahoney v. Industrial Commission.

New Illinois Caselaw Regarding Allocation Of Fault At Trial:

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:21:00 GMT

In Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 758 (1st Dist., 2006), the Illinois First District Appellate Court was presented with the following question: “Is a defendant who settles with the plaintiff prior to trial still a ‘defendant sued by the plaintiff’ within the meaning of section 2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure” such that fault may be allocated to settling defendants at trial? The court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that “all defendants sued by the plaintiff, including those who settled prior to trial, may be included on the jury verdict form so that a fact finder can assign each defendant their degree of relative fault, if any.” The First District came to a different conclusion than the Fifth District in Blake v. Hy Ho Restaurant, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 807 (5th Dist., 1995) and the Seventh Circuit, which relied upon Blake, in Freislinger v. Emro Propane Co., 99 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir., 1996). The First District instead agreed with the Fourth District’s interpretation of 2-1117 in Skaggs v. Senior Services of Central Illinois, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 1021 (4th Dist., 2005). Interestingly, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant would be able to “levy fault to nonparties at trial,” and stated that “[F]ault is to be apportioned among all defendants sued by the plaintiff,” and “[a]ny settlement entered into with any defendant should not serve to alter the remaining defendant(s)' degree of fault.” Ready, 854 N.E.2d at 764.

Relatives/occupants of home owned by named insured are not members of insured's "household" under homeowner's insurance policy.

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:18:00 GMT

In State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Martinez, 2008 WL 3189608 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.), the Illinois Appellate Court held that the occupants of a home, and owners of a dog which bit a child, were not entitled to coverage under the homeowners insurance policy issued to the named insureds and owners of the home, because they were not members of the named insured’s household. Although the named insureds held legal title to the home where the child was bitten by the dog, the home was actually occupied by the owners of the dog, who were relatives of the named insureds. At no time did the named insureds themselves actually reside in the home, or intend to do so, as they had only agreed to take title in order to assist the owners of the dog in purchasing the home because of the dog owners’ poor credit history. Because the named insureds resided at a different address, the Court held that the home’s occupants did not qualify as members of the named insureds’ household, so that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the home’s occupants under the policy.

Insurer Prejudice Is Not Required To Assert Late Notice Defense:

Tue, 20 Jan 2015 20:15:00 GMT

In the recent decision of Country Mutual Insurance Company v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., 222 Ill.2d 303 (2006), the Illinois Supreme Court held that an insurer is not required to show that it was prejudiced by the failure of the insured to provide timely notice of suit before the insurer may rely on late notice as a defense to coverage. The Court stated that a policy condition requiring that the insured notify the insurer of any claim or suit against the insured “as soon as practicable,” is interpreted to mean “within a reasonable time.” Overruling one line of cases, such as Rice v. AAA Aerostar, Inc., 294 Ill.App.3d 801 (1998), which required that the insurer actually be prejudiced by the insured’s failure to provide timely notice in order to successfully assert the defense, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer is merely one factor in determining whether a policyholder has provided reasonable notice. The Court also stated that “once it is determined that the insurer did not receive reasonable notice of an occurrence or a lawsuit, the policy holder may not recover under the policy, regardless of whether the lack of reasonable notice prejudiced the insurer.”